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Abstract—We propose a framework by which websites can co-
ordinate to detect credential stuffing on individual user accounts.
Our detection algorithm teases apart normal login behavior
(involving password reuse, entering correct passwords into the
wrong sites, etc.) from credential stuffing, by leveraging modern
anomaly detection and carefully tracking suspicious logins. Web-
sites coordinate using a novel private membership-test protocol,
thereby ensuring that information about passwords is not leaked;
this protocol is highly scalable, partly due to its use of cuckoo
filters, and is more secure than similarly scalable alternatives in
an important measure that we define. We use probabilistic model
checking to estimate our credential-stuffing detection accuracy
across a range of operating points. These methods might be of
independent interest for their novel application of formal methods
to estimate the usability impacts of our design. We show that even
a minimal-infrastructure deployment of our framework should
already support the combined login load experienced by the
airline, hotel, retail, and consumer banking industries in the U.S.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, massive numbers of website account
credentials have been compromised via password database
breaches, phishing, and keylogging. According to a report
by Shape Security [59], 2.3 billion credentials were reported
compromised in 2017 alone. Such compromised username-
password pairs place those users’ other accounts in jeopardy,
since people tend to reuse their passwords across different
websites (e.g., [13], [31], [40], [51], [60]). As such, automat-
ically attempting leaked username-password pairs at a wide
array of sites compromises vast numbers of accounts, a type
of attack termed credential stuffing. Credential stuffing is now
a dominant method of account takeover [59] and is remarkably
commonplace; e.g., Akamai estimates it observed 30 billion
credential-stuffing attempts in 2018 [1]. Credential stuffing
imposes actual losses estimated at $300M, $400M, $1.7B
and $6B on the hotel, airline, consumer banking, and retail
industries, respectively, per year [59, Table 2]. A survey of 538
IT security practitioners who are responsible for the security
of their companies’ websites revealed a total annualized cost
of credential stuffing across their organizations, excluding
fraud, of $3.85M, owing to costs of prevention, detection, and
remediation; downtime; and customer churn [39, Tables 1–3].
Despite the prominence of credential stuffing, users are
remarkably resistant to taking steps to defend themselves
against it. Thomas et al. [65] report that less than 3.1% of users
who suffer account hijacks enable two-factor authentication
after recovering their accounts. Users are similarly resistant to
stopping password reuse even despite specific warnings when
doing so, leading Golla et al. to conclude that “notifications
alone appear insufficient in solving password reuse” [34]. And
though password managers would seem to enable users to
more easily avoid password reuse, users are reluctant to adopt
them. In a 2016 survey of 1040 American adults, only 12%
reported ever using password management software, and only
3% said this is the password technique they rely on most [61].
In a 2019 Google/Harris Poll survey of 3000 U.S. adults, still
only 24% reported using a password manager [35].
Conceding that the factors that enable credential stuffing
to succeed today are likely to persist for the foreseeable
future, we propose a framework by which websites could
cooperate to detect it on a per-user basis. Developing such
a framework is not straightforward, in part because the exact
behaviors that such a framework should detect are difficult to
define. Anecdotally, users sometimes engage in behaviors that
might appear quite similar to a credential-stuffing attack, e.g.,
submitting the same small handful of passwords to multiple
sites in the course of logging into each, if she is unsure of
which password she set at which site. A framework to detect
credential stuffing on a user’s accounts will need to tease apart
behaviors that the user might normally undertake from those
that amount to actual credential abuse.
To do so, our framework leverages the following technique.
Anomaly detection systems (ADS) now exist by which a site
can differentiate login attempts by the legitimate user from
those by attackers, even sophisticated ones, with moderately
good accuracy, using features other than the password entered
(e.g., [29]). A site in our framework leverages this capability
to track suspicious login attempts locally, namely abnormal
attempts (per the ADS) using an incorrect password or,
for sites requiring second-factor authentication for abnormal
login attempts, such attempts for which the second-factor
authentication fails (even if the password is correct). Then,
our framework enables a site (the requester) receiving a
login attempt that it deems abnormal to query other sites
(the responders) where this user has accounts, to determine
the number of them at which this same password has been
submitted in suspicious login attempts. If this number is larger
than a threshold, then the requester deems this login attempt
to be credential abuse—even if the password is correct.
Of course, such an approach raises concerns. First, it risks
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false detections, and lacking datasets of how legitimate users
submit login attempts—both correct and incorrect ones—
across their many accounts, the false detection rate seems
hopeless to evaluate. Second, measuring the true detection
rate of this scheme would require knowledge of how attackers
conduct credential-stuffing attacks today (again, we are aware
of no such datasets) and, more importantly, how attackers
would respond if our framework were deployed by a collection
of websites. Finally, since both the requester’s query and
a responder’s suspicious-password set will contain sensitive
passwords, supporting these queries has the potential to leak
sensitive data to the requester or responder.
We address these concerns as follows. To estimate the true
and false detection rates of our design, we formulate exper-
iments in the form of Markov decision processes (MDPs),
in which the adversary’s choices in the experiment determine
a probability of the adversary achieving a specified goal in
our framework. In the true-detection-rate MDP, the adversary
corresponds to a credential stuffer, and we leverage proba-
bilistic model checking to calculate the true detection rate for
the best adversarial strategy, yielding what we believe is a
conservative estimate of our true detection rate in practice.
The false-detection-rate MDP casts the “adversary” as the
legitimate user who knows how she chooses her passwords
(i.e., the distribution) but who cannot recall which one she set
at which website. Again, we allow the “adversary” (forgetful
user) arbitrary flexibility to submit login attempts, toward the
“goal” of ensuring that she will be detected as a credential
stuffer when eventually entering her correct password at a
designated website. We use probabilistic model checking to
find the best strategy for this “adversary”, which we believe
serves as a conservative estimate of our false-detection rate.
To address concerns over account security while supporting
queries to suspicious-password sets, we develop a new private
membership-test (PMT) protocol that ensures that responders
do not learn the requester’s query or the protocol result (no
matter how they misbehave) and that limits the information
about the responder’s suspicious-password set that is leaked to
the requester. We quantify the suspicious-password-set leakage
in terms of a measure we call extraction complexity, which
informally is the number of protocol runs a responder can tol-
erate before succumbing to an offline attack on its set. We show
that our protocol improves over previous communication-
efficient PMT protocols substantially in this measure.
Finally, we present an implementation of our framework by
which a requester leverages a directory to contact responders
where a user holds accounts. We evaluate performance of our
design in two privacy contexts, one where the directory is
trusted to hide the requester (i.e., where the user is currently
active) from responders, and one where it is not and so the
requester contacts the directory using Tor [20]. We show that
even with just one directory machine, various configurations
of our design can already support the typical login load
experienced by the airline, hotel, retail, and consumer banking
industries in the U.S., combined.
To summarize, our contributions are as follows:
• We develop a novel framework by which websites can
coordinate to detect credential stuffing on a user’s accounts,
and we conservatively evaluate the true and false detection
rates of this algorithm using probabilistic model checking
(Secs. III–IV).
• We instantiate this framework with a new PMT protocol that
ensures security against a malicious requester or responder,
including improving on other communication-efficient de-
signs in a security measure (extraction complexity) that is
important in our context (Sec. V).
• We report the performance of an implementation of our
framework under two privacy configurations, in experiments
ranging up to 256 responders (Sec. VI). Our results indicate
that even with minimal infrastructure, our design should
scale to accommodate real login loads experienced by major
sectors of the U.S. economy.
II. RELATED WORK
Interfering with password reuse: A user’s reuse of the
same passwords across her accounts is the impetus for creden-
tial stuffing. Password reuse is widespread (e.g., [7], [54], [60],
[13], [40], [51], [68]) and is very resistant to warnings to avoid
it—even reactive warnings triggered by a detected reuse [34].
Most closely related to our work is a recent proposal by which
websites could coordinate to actively interfere with a user’s
attempt to reuse the same or similar passwords across those
sites [70]. While we borrow ingredients of this design (see
Sec. III-A and Sec. IV), our work targets credential stuffing
directly, without interfering with a user’s password reuse
across sites or assuming that it does not occur. These different
goals lead to a fundamentally different design, requiring novel
underlying cryptographic protocols (Sec. V) and wholly novel
detection algorithms (Sec. III).
Detecting user selection of compromised or popular
passwords: It is now common (and recommended [36]) for
sites to cross-reference account passwords against known-
leaked passwords, either for their own users (e.g., [10]) or as a
service for others (e.g., https://haveibeenpwned.com). Thomas
et al. [66] and Li et al. [45] proposed improvements to these
types of services that leak less information to or from the ser-
vice. Pal et al. [50] developed personalized password strength
meters that warn users when selecting passwords similar to
ones previously compromised, particularly their own. More
distantly related are services that track password popularity
and enable a website to detect if one of its users selects a
popular password [57], [47]. In contrast to these works, our
work detects credential stuffing of a user’s password before
its compromise is reported (which today takes an average of
15 months [59]) and irrespective of its popularity.
Discovering compromised accounts: Several techniques
have been proposed to discover compromised accounts. For
example, to detect the breach of its password database, a
site might list several site-generated honey passwords in the
database alongside the valid password for each account [5],
[41], [24]. Any submission of a honey password in a login
attempt then discloses the breach of the password database.
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Similarly, honey accounts for a user can be set up at websites
where she does not have an account, specifically for detecting
any attempt to log into them with the password of one of her
actual accounts [17]. Both of these can be used in conjunction
with our framework but do not supersede it, as attackers
holding a user’s correct password for one account (e.g., as
obtained from phishing the user) can use it to attempt logins
at the user’s actual accounts at other websites without either
of these techniques detecting it. This is precisely the type of
attack that we seek to detect here.
Detecting guessing attacks: Herley and Schechter [38]
provide an algorithm by which a large-volume website can
estimate the likelihood that a login is part of a guessing attack,
based on the assumption that these malicious logins are a small
fraction of total logins. They point out that this assumption “is
of course not true for an attacker exploiting password re-use
or other non-guessing approach”, which is our interest here.
Schechter et al. [58] suggest features for distinguishing benign
login attempts from guessing attacks, though these features
should not be characteristic of credential stuffing.
III. DETECTING CREDENTIAL STUFFING
In this section, we present our framework to detect cre-
dential stuffing on a user’s accounts. Our framework detects
credential stuffing on a per-user basis, and so is agnostic to
whether the user is the only one being subjected to credential
stuffing (e.g., after one of her passwords was phished) or
whether she is one of many (e.g., after a password database
breach).
A. Assumptions
Account identifiers: Our framework assumes the ability
to associate the accounts of the same user across different
websites—or more specifically, to do so at least as well as
a credential-stuffing attacker could. When user accounts are
tied to email addresses confirmed during account creation,
this can generally be done, even despite the email-address
variations for a single email account that are supported by
email service providers [70]. As such, we will generally refer
to a user’s account identifier a as being the same across
multiple websites. We also assume the ability of one website at
which a user has an account to contact (perhaps anonymously)
other websites where the user has an account. In our design,
this ability is supported using a logical directory service, as
will be detailed in Sec. IV.
Password management: Nothing in our framework re-
quires that a site store passwords in the clear or in a reversible
fashion, and most existing best practices (e.g., using expensive
hash functions to compute password hashes [62], [3]) can be
applied within our scheme. In particular, while in Sec. III-B
we will use s.pwd[a] to denote the correct password for
account a at site s, we stress that s need not (and should
not) store this password explicitly.
We do make one concession in password-management best
practices, however, which some other defenses have also
made (e.g., [33], [70]). In our algorithm, each site s will
maintain a set s.susp[a] of hashes of passwords submitted in
suspicious login attempts on account a. (This will be detailed
in Sec. III-B.) For one site s (the requester) to query whether
a hash value e is present in s′.susp[a] at another site s′ (the
responder), it is necessary that hashing be deterministic and
any salting be performed consistently per identifier a across
sites. To do so, the salt for identifier a could be generated
from a or generated randomly and distributed to a site s
by the directory when s registers as a responder for a (see
Sec. IV-B). In this way, precomputation (before breaching a
site) by an attacker to aid his search for π will need to be
repeated per identifier a, dramatically increasing his costs.
Below, we elide these details and simply write “π ∈ s.susp[a]”
to denote the membership of an element e in the set s.susp[a],
where e uniquely identifies the password π from which it was
computed but that also incorporates this salting.
Anomaly detection: The key assumption we make about
sites that participate in our design is that each one conducts
anomaly detection on the login attempts to its site, based on
locally available features such as the time, client IP address,
useragent string, etc. For a 10% false-detection rate, Freeman
et al. [29] report a 99% true detection rate for attacker logins
to an account a from the country from which the user for
account a normally logs in (a so-called researching attacker).
Also for a 10% false-detection rate, they report a 74% true-
detection rate for the most advanced attackers they consider,
who also initiate login attempts with the same useragent string
as the legitimate user (a so-called phishing attacker).
Here we treat each site’s anomaly-detection system (ADS)
as a block-box that takes as input a group of login features
and classifies the login as either normal or abnormal. We
assume that the ADS can be parameterized (e.g., with a
threshold) to tune its true- and false-detection rates, where a
“detection” means an abnormal classification. Our credential-
stuffing detection algorithm will leverage two parameter set-
tings for the ADS, yielding for each login attempt L an ADS
output of the form 〈abnormalcol(L), abnormalcnt(L)〉, a pair of
boolean values. Because abnormalcol(L) and abnormalcnt(L)
are derived from a common ADS, these indicators are not
independent. We denote their (false-, true-) detection rates
as (FDRcolads,TDR
col
ads) and (FDR
cnt
ads,TDR
cnt
ads), respectively, and
assume that either TDRcolads ≥ TDR
cnt
ads and FDR
col
ads ≥ FDR
cnt
ads
or TDRcntads ≥ TDR
col
ads and FDR
cnt
ads ≥ FDR
col
ads, as otherwise
one parameter setting would be strictly better than the other.
The “cnt” and “col” annotations refer to the phases of our
algorithm, discussed in Sec. III-B. When the login L is clear
from context, we will generally elide it and simply denote the
ADS output as 〈abnormalcol, abnormalcnt〉.
Threat model: We specify our credential-stuffing detec-
tion algorithm in Sec. III-B assuming sites that cooperate to
detect credential stuffing against a user’s accounts at those
sites. In Secs. IV–V, however, we address the potential for
malicious participating sites. In particular, we address user
login privacy against participating sites in Sec. IV-A and
the risk of denial-of-service attacks by participating sites in
Sec. IV-B. Finally, we address user account security despite
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misbehavior of participating sites in Sec. V. We make no effort
to address sites that misbehave so as to reduce true detections
of our framework, since these sites could equally well do so by
simply not participating. The directory, introduced in Sec. IV,
is trusted to not conduct denials-of-service and to help defend
against them (see Sec. IV-B), but is not trusted for security of
sites’ user accounts.
B. Algorithm
To detect credential stuffing, each website processes each
login attempt in two phases, called the collecting phase and
the counting phase. To support these phases, each site s
maintains a set s.susp[a] of (salted hashes of) passwords
used in “suspicious” login attempts to account a at site s, as
discussed below. Site s assembles s.susp[a] in the collecting
phases of local login attempts to account a, and queries the
s′.susp[a] sets at other sites s′ in the counting phases of
logins to a at s. These queries are performed using private
membership tests (PMTs), which hide s’s query when acting
as a requester, and hide the contents of s.susp[a] when acting
as a responder in the protocol. We defer details of the PMT
protocol to Sec. V.
Our algorithm begins when a site receives a local login at-
tempt. The site submits the login features for classification by
its ADS, yielding a classification 〈abnormalcol, abnormalcnt〉.
The site then performs the collecting phase and the counting
phase, in that order.
Collecting phase: In the collecting phase of a login
attempt to account a at site s, if abnormalcol = true, then
s applies one of the following two rules as appropriate:
SUSP If s does not support second-factor authentication,
then s adds π to s.susp[a] if the password is
incorrect (i.e., π 6= s.pwd[a]).
SUSP+ If s supports second-factor authentication, then s
adds π to s.susp[a]. If π = s.pwd[a], then it is
subsequently removed from s.susp[a] only once a
second-factor challenge issued by s to the owner
of account a is completed successfully.
Counting phase: In the counting phase of a login at-
tempt to account a at site s, if abnormalcnt = true and
if the submitted password π is correct for account a (i.e.,
π = s.pwd[a]), then s performs the role of the requester using
password π in PMTs. In each of these PMTs, another site s′
where account a exists performs the role of the responder
with set s′.susp[a]; i.e., s′ interacts with s to allow s to learn
whether π ∈ s′.susp[a]. (In Sec. IV we will discuss how s
contacts each s′.) Site s then detects credential stuffing if
|
{
s′
∣∣ s′ 6= s ∧ π ∈ s′.susp[a]}| ≥ w, for a specified attack
width w.
Again, the collecting phase is performed first, or more
precisely, s begins its counting phase only once any addition
to s.susp[a] in the preceding collecting phase is complete.
Similarly, upon receiving a PMT query from s, site s′ defers
responding until any additions to s′.susp[a] in ongoing col-
lecting phases for the same account a are completed locally.
Note that if SUSP would add π to s.susp[a], then SUSP+
would, as well. In addition, SUSP+ allows even s.pwd[a] to
be added to s.susp[a] if it is submitted in a login that is
deemed abnormal but the resulting second-factor challenge
is not completed successfully. When evaluating SUSP+, we
assume that an attacker is unable to complete the second-
factor challenge (which is generally true [21]), but that for
usability purposes, the site invokes the second-factor challenge
only on logins for which abnormalcol = true. Some sites s can
maintain s.susp[a] according to SUSP while others use SUSP+.
In our evaluations in Sec. III-C, we will consider the impact
of different balances of sites that use SUSP versus SUSP+.
SUSP and SUSP+ indicate when s should add a password
to s.susp[a], but not when s should remove a password from
it. One approach would be for s to remove a password
from s.susp[a] if that password is not used in an attempted
login to account a for a specified expiration time. Provided
that s’s login interface rate-limits login attempts on a (as is
recommended [36]), an upper bound on the capacity of s’s set
s.susp[a] can be ensured. For example, if s permits 100 failed
login attempts on a single account in any 30-day period [8,
Section 8.2.3], and if each password expires from s.susp[a] in
30 days since its last use in a login attempt, then |s.susp[a]|
will never exceed 101. Such a delay should allow ample time
for our framework to detect even a moderately aggressive
credential-stuffing attack, or conversely should dramatically
slow a credential-stuffing attack if it is to go undetected.
Finally, when adding a password π to s.susp[a], s may
reduce π to a canonical form, e.g., converting capital letters at
selected positions to lowercase, or converting a specific digit
to a digit wildcard. Provided that the rules for this canoni-
calization are employed by both requesters and responders,
our framework can then detect stuffing of some passwords
similar to that chosen by this user at another site (“credential
tweaking”). Of course, s could also explicitly add selected
passwords similar to π, but at the cost of increasing |s.susp[a]|.
We do not consider these extensions further here.
C. Effectiveness
We now estimate the false- and true-detection rates for the
algorithm in Sec. III-B across a range of parameter settings.
In doing so, we seek to demonstrate that our algorithm can
be effective in detecting credential stuffing without imposing
significantly on legitimate users. We stop short of recommend-
ing a specific course of action when a site detects credential
stuffing via our algorithm, though we will discuss alternatives
at the end of this section.
Evaluating false- and true-detection rates empirically would
require datasets that are unavailable to us. To evaluate false de-
tections empirically, we would presumably need datasets that
shed light on how users both set passwords across websites
and then try (and sometimes fail) to log into websites using
them. To evaluate true detections, we would need datasets of
recorded credential-stuffing campaigns, along with the correct
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and guessed passwords and (for sites supporting SUSP+) the
results of second-factor challenges.
In the absence of any foreseeable way of obtaining such
datasets, we instead perform an evaluation using probabilistic
model checking. The tool we used to perform probabilistic
model checking is Prism [44], which supports automated
analysis of Markov decision processes (MDP). Each MDP we
design models an actor interacting with a specific account a,
who is either the legitimate user of a or an attacker, across
multiple websites. To do so, we specify the actor as a set
of states and possible actions. When in a state, the actor
can choose from among these actions nondeterministically;
the chosen action determines a probability distribution on the
state to which the actor then transitions. These state transitions
satisfy the Markov property: informally, the probability of next
transitioning to a specific state depends only on the current
state and the actor’s chosen action. Prism exhaustively searches
all decisions an actor can make to maximize the probability
of the actor succeeding in its goal.
Below, we assume that the legitimate user’s password
choices across websites are represented by a probability distri-
bution Da ; i.e., Da(π) is the probability with which the user
selects π as its password for any given site. We abuse notation
slightly and also use Da to denote the set of passwords with
non-zero probability. For example, we write π ∈ Da to indi-
cate that Da(π) > 0; |Da | to denote the number of passwords
π for which π ∈ Da ; and π
$
← Da to denote the selection of
a password from distribution Da and its assignment to π. As
some prior works [4], [69], we modelDa as a Zipf distribution
with parameter λa ≥ 0, so that the user chooses her k-th
most probable password (1 ≤ k ≤ |Da |) independently with
probability (1/kλa )/(1/1λa + 1/2λa + . . .+ 1/|Da |λa ).
The MDPs below need to synthetically model the distribu-
tion of 〈abnormalcol, abnormalcnt〉 pairs for login attempts or
sessions thereof, similar to their distribution in practice (no-
tably, lacking independence). To do so for specified detection
rates DRcolads and DR
cnt
ads, let hi ∈ {col, cnt} and lo ∈ {col, cnt}
be such that DRhiads and DR
lo
ads are the larger and smaller of
DRcolads and DR
cnt
ads, respectively. Then, we let
P
(
abnormalhi = true
)
= DRhiads
P
(
abnormallo = true
∣∣∣ abnormalhi = true) = DRloads/DRhiads
P
(
abnormallo = true
∣∣∣ abnormalhi = false) = 0
We denote selection of 〈abnormalcol, abnormalcnt〉 according
to this distribution in the experiment descriptions below by the
notation 〈abnormalcol, abnormalcnt〉
$
← ads(DRcolads, DR
cnt
ads).
Conservatively estimating false detections via Jekyll-
Hyde experiments: False detections can arise in our frame-
work; indeed, even the entry of the correct password for an
account at a website by the legitimate user might trigger a
credential-stuffing detection if the user erroneously submit-
ted the same password to other websites (that use SUSP),
or even if correctly but without completing a second-factor
challenge from those sites (that use SUSP+). Here we leverage
probabilistic model checking to conservatively estimate the
probability with which a user induces a false detection.
We express the process by which a user might do so
as a MDP in which the legitimate user is represented by
two parties, to whom we refer here as “Dr. Jekyll” (J ) and
“Mr.Hyde” (H).1 Informally, the user’s H persona knows the
distribution from which the user previously set passwords at
various websites, but does not remember which password the
user set at which site. H attempts a number of logins before
turning control over to the J persona, who is challenged
to log into another website, for which he does remember
the password. Still, J ’s entry of the correct password might
be detected as possible credential stuffing, depending on the
actions of H before him. In a Jekyll-Hyde experiment, then,
we say that H wins (and J loses) if J ’s login attempt is
(falsely) detected as credential stuffing, and otherwise H loses
(and J wins).
Since both J and H represent the legitimate user, we
assume both can complete any second-factor challenges that a
website issues. Under this assumption, there is no difference
between SUSP and SUSP+, and so we do not differentiate
sites supporting SUSP+ from those supporting SUSP in Jekyll-
Hyde experiments. Since users who forget their passwords
presumably tend to attempt multiple password guesses in
the same login session (and so from the same platform and
location) until finding the right one, H is classified once by
the ADS at site s for all login attempts there. Finally, we
forbid H from attempting logins at a site s after he has
already submitted the correct password to s (see step 2) to
preclude him from trivially winning. After all, once H has
“recalled” the correct password for s, he could artificially add
extra passwords to s.susp[a] by “attempting” logins with them,
thereby unreasonably inflating his chances of winning.
More precisely, a Jekyll-Hyde experiment takes as input
an account identifier a, the distribution Da , a number of
responders na , an integer w, and probabilities FDR
col
ads and
FDRcntads, and proceeds as follows:
(1) Sites si, for 0 ≤ i ≤ na , are initialized as follows:
• A password si.pwd[a]
$
← Da is selected independently
for account a at website si.
• The suspicious password set is cleared: si.susp[a]← ∅.
• To model the classification of H by the ADS at si, a
boolean si.collectionFlag is set to abnormal
col where
〈abnormalcol, abnormalcnt〉
$
← ads(FDRcolads, FDR
cnt
ads).
(2) H is given the experiment inputs and performs login
attempts on a at any of s1, . . . , sna , provided that if H
submits the correct password si.pwd[a] in a login attempt
at si, then this is H’s last login attempt at si. Each
incorrect login attempt at si adds the attempted password
to si.susp[a] if and only if si.collectionFlag is true.
(3) Once H is done, J logs into s0 using the cor-
rect password s0.pwd[a]. If abnormal
cnt = true for
1In their namesake novella [63], Mr. Hyde and Dr. Jekyll are the evil and
good personae, respectively, of the same person.
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〈abnormalcol, abnormalcnt〉
$
← ads(FDRcolads, FDR
cnt
ads) and
if |
{
si
∣∣ s0.pwd[a] ∈ si.susp[a] ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ na}| ≥ w, then
H wins. Otherwise, J wins.
We define FDRcsd to be the probability with whichH wins and
so J loses, under an optimal strategy for H. We believe that
FDRcsd is a very conservative estimate on the false detection
rate of our framework in practice, in that it reflects the worst
case behavior (in terms of usability) ofH. Moreover, by testing
|
{
si
∣∣ s0.pwd[a] ∈ si.susp[a] ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ na}| ≥ w only for
J , i.e., after H has filled the suspicious password sets of
sites as much as possible, our false-detection estimates are
even more conservative (notably, ignoring H’s logins where
he went undetected).
Conservatively estimating true detections using account-
compromise experiments: To evaluate the true-detection rate
of our credential-stuffing algorithm, we use a different type
of MDP, in which a credential-stuffing attacker C is given a
“leaked” password πleaked
$
← Da and allowed to attempt
logins using it at sites s1, . . . , sna where a has accounts.
The attacker knows which sites have second-factor authen-
tication enabled for abnormal logins, as specified by a set
has2FA ⊆ {s1, . . . , sna}. Each site si ∈ has2FA therefore uses
SUSP+ to manage si.susp[a], and we assume that C cannot
pass a second-factor challenge for a. Other sites use SUSP.
We also allow the attacker knowledge of the true-detection
rates TDRcolads and TDR
cnt
ads of sites’ ADS.
As such, our true-detection experiment takes as input an
account identifier a, the distribution Da , the number of
responders na , the set has2FA, an integer w, and probabilities
TDRcolads and TDR
cnt
ads, and proceeds as follows:
(1) Sites si, for 1 ≤ i ≤ na , are initialized as follows:
• A password si.pwd[a]
$
← Da is selected independently
for account a at website si.
• The suspicious password set is cleared: si.susp[a]← ∅.
• A boolean si.attemptedFlag is initialized to false .
(2) C is given a, πleaked
$
← Da , has2FA, TDR
col
ads, TDR
cnt
ads,
w, and the opportunity to perform one login attempt using
πleaked at each of s1, . . . , sna . On C’s l-th login attempt
(l = 1, 2, . . .), let sil denote the site at which this attempt
occurs. Then:
• Set 〈abnormalcol, abnormalcnt〉
$
← ads(TDRcolads,
TDRcntads) and sil .collectionFlag← abnormal
col.
• sil adds πleaked to sil .susp[a] if abnormal
col = true
and either πleaked 6= sil .pwd[a] (per SUSP) or, if
sil ∈ has2FA, even if πleaked = sil .pwd[a] (per
SUSP+, since we assume that C cannot pass second-
factor authentication).
• If l > w, then
– sil .attemptedFlag← true
– sil .detectedFlag ← true if abnormal
cnt and, at this
point, |
{
si′
∣∣ πleaked ∈ si′ .susp[a] ∧ i′ 6= il}| ≥ w.
Otherwise, sil .detectedFlag← false .
When the experiment is finished, define
accessed =
{
si
∣∣∣ si.attemptedFlag∧πleaked = si.pwd[a] ∧(si.collectionFlag⇒ si 6∈ has2FA)
}
detected =
{
si
∣∣ si ∈ accessed ∧ si.detectedFlag}
Then, we define TDRcsd =
E(|detected|)
E(|accessed|) where this ratio is
computed using the adversary’s optimal strategy for min-
imizing E (|detected|) among all strategies that maximize
E (|accessed|). The condition l > w in the last bullet of
step (2) limits accessed and detected to include only sites
at which the attacker succeeded or was detected, respectively,
starting with the (w+1)-th login attempt, since by design, our
algorithm cannot detect w or fewer credential-stuffing login
attempts. As such, TDRcsd is best interpreted as the true-
detection rate for attacks of width greater than w. We expect
that TDRcsd is very conservative as an estimate of the true
detection rate in practice, since it is computed using the best
possible strategy for C, equipped with perfect knowledge of
parameters he would not generally have.
Trading off TDRcsd and FDRcsd: Given the above MDPs
and resulting TDRcsd and FDRcsd measures, we now ex-
plore how they vary together as w is varied, for fixed
(FDRcolads,TDR
col
ads) and (FDR
cnt
ads,TDR
cnt
ads) pairs and parame-
ters λa , |Da |, na , and |has2FA|. The (FDR
col
ads,TDR
col
ads) and
(FDRcntads,TDR
cnt
ads) pairs we consider were drawn by inspection
from ROC curves published by Freeman et al. [29, Fig. 4b]
for their ADS, for two categories of attackers: a research-
ing attacker who issues login attempts from the legitimate
user’s country (presumably after researching that user), and
a phishing attacker who issues login attempts both from the
legitimate user’s country and presenting the same useragent
string as the legitimate user would (presumably after phish-
ing the user). In particular, phishing attackers are the most
powerful attackers considered by Freeman et al. The curves
labeled (FDRads,TDRads) in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 depict the ROC
curves reported by Freeman et al. for phishing and researching
attackers, respectively.
Fig. 1 shows representative ROC curves for a phishing
attacker, and Fig. 2 shows curves for a researching attacker.
“Baseline” configurations, detailed in each figure’s caption,
are shown in Fig. 1a and Fig. 2a. Each figure to the right of
the baseline shows the effects of strengthening security in one
parameter, starting from the baseline. So, for example, starting
from the baseline, Fig. 1b shows the effects of users choosing
passwords more uniformly (by changing λa = 1 to λa = 0).
Similarly, Fig. 1c shows the effects, again starting from the
baseline, of a user leveraging five passwords versus only four
(i.e., by changing |Da | = 4 to |Da | = 5).
These ROC curves suggest that our credential-stuffing de-
tector can be highly effective in detecting credential stuffing
without impinging substantially on usability. Notably, our
detector is more effective than simply using a state-of-the-art
ADS [29] for a wide range of parameter settings.
Choosing a good operating point for our design depends on
how a credential-stuffing detection is treated at the detecting
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(a) Baseline
0.0 0.2 0.4
(b) λa = 0
0.0 0.2 0.4
(c) |Da | = 5
0.0 0.2 0.4
(d) na = 20
0.0 0.2 0.4
(e) |has2FA| = 5
0.0 0.2 0.4
(f) FDRcntads = 0.40
TDRcntads = 0.97
FDRcsd
Fig. 1: Phishing attacker. Baseline: |Da | = 4, λa = 1, na = 10, |has2FA| = 0, (FDR
cnt
ads,TDR
cnt
ads) = (0.30, 0.95).
(FDRcolads,TDR
col
ads) = (0.01, 0.65) (FDR
col
ads,TDR
col
ads) = (0.02, 0.80) (FDR
col
ads,TDR
col
ads) = (0.05, 0.93)
(FDRads,TDRads) [29]
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(a) Baseline
0.00 0.05 0.10
(b) λa = 0
0.00 0.05 0.10
(c) |Da | = 5
0.00 0.05 0.10
(d) na = 20
0.00 0.05 0.10
(e) |has2FA| = 5
0.00 0.05 0.10
(f) FDRcntads = 0.20
TDRcntads = 1.00
FDRcsd
Fig. 2: Researching attacker. Baseline: |Da | = 4, λa = 1, na = 10, |has2FA| = 0, (FDR
cnt
ads,TDR
cnt
ads) = (0.10, 0.99).
site. An aggressive response such as locking the account pend-
ing a password reset (performed after two-factor authentication
if deployed, or a different intervention if not) would favor
keeping FDRcsd small, e.g., FDRcsd < 0.05. A less aggressive
response, such as invoking two-factor authentication on every
login attempt until the password is reset, might allow a higher
FDRcsd, e.g., 0.05 ≤ FDRcsd < 0.10. Simply warning the user
might permit an even higher FDRcsd.
IV. THE DIRECTORY
Our framework in Sec. III requires one website to run PMT
protocols as a requester with other sites where the same user
has accounts. This capability is similar to that implemented in
previous work [70] using a directory that stores, per account
identifier a, an address (possibly a pseudonym) to contact each
site where the account a exists. Assuming a one-round PMT
protocol (as in Sec. V), the directory receives a PMT query
from a requester for an account a and forwards a copy of this
query to each site with the same account. The directory then
receives every responder’s reply, permutes them randomly, and
forwards the responses back to the requester in a batch. By
shuffling the responses, the directory ensures that the requester
learns only the number of responders that returned true
(respectively, false), not which ones, for good measure. (The
directory learns nothing about the private inputs to/outputs
from the PMT protocol by requesters and responders.) Since
our goal here is not to innovate in the design of scalable
directory services—itself a topic with a long history, with
many deployments that far surpass our needs here, e.g., [19],
[48]—we largely adopt this design in our implementation
(see Sec. VI-A). Below we address two concerns about such
a directory specifically in our context, however, namely the
potentials for privacy risks and denials of service.
A. Privacy
Among the design goals adopted in previous work [70] is
hiding the identity of the requester from the responders and
the identity of each responder from other responders and the
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requester. The purpose of doing so is hiding where the user
has accounts, a property termed “account location privacy”. To
this end, the requester and responders either trust the directory
to hide their identities (as an anonymizing proxy, cf., [6], [30])
or communicate with the directory using Tor [20].
Unfortunately, account location privacy is impossible in our
framework against an active attacker: an attacker can attempt
a login on account a at a site s with a truly random password
π, and if a exists at s and the attempt is deemed abnormal,
π will be added to s.susp[a] under SUSP (or SUSP+). The
attacker can then attempt to use π in the PMT protocol as a
requester, thereby learning whether some responder returns a
true result; if so, then apparently a exists at s. This attack is
of academic interest only, since in practice, an attacker could
equally easily determine whether a exists at s by simply trying
to establish account a at s; most sites will inform the attacker
if a already exists. Still, our framework only further renders
irrelevant any attempts to hide where the user has accounts.
We thus settle for a weaker notion of privacy here, namely
hiding the identity of the requester only, which will at least
hide the site at which the user is presently logging in. As
such, while in our design the requester still communicates to
the directory using Tor if it does not trust the directory to
protect its identity, there is no point in the responders doing
so; the responders receive requests directly from the directory
and respond directly to it. We refer to the model in which
requesters contact the directory directly as TLP (“trusted for
login privacy”), and the model in which requesters contact the
directory using Tor as ULP (“untrusted for login privacy”).
B. Denials of Service
Like any critical service (cf., DNS), the directory should
employ state-of-the-art defenses against blunt denial-of-service
(DoS) attempts (e.g., network resource exhaustion). Our con-
cern here is whether the directory introduces any DoS risks
based on its particular functionality. The main such DoS risk
is associated with the process by which a website s informs
the directory that the user with identifier a has registered an
account at s and so s should now be consulted as a responder
for a in the framework of Sec. III. The risk lies primarily in
malicious actors falsifying such registrations, e.g., potentially
registering millions of sites per identifier a.
In our envisioned method of deploying our framework,
this risk can be managed. For example, in Sec. VI-D, we
evaluate the scalability of our design to support the U.S.
airline, hotel, retail, and consumer banking industries. For
a deployment by these industries, the websites permitted to
register as a responder for an account a can be limited to
approved members of these industry consortia. The directory
can then limit each approved member to at most one such
registration for a. In doing so, the directory can enforce
a limit on the number of site registrations per account a.
Moreover, owing to the security guarantees of our framework
(specifically, see Sec. V-G), a website has no motivation to
register for an account a superfluously, since it learns nothing
as a responder in the protocol (except that the user for a is
active at some website).
That said, if further limiting the registrations for account a
is desirable, then the directory can leverage the online presence
of the user when creating account a at site s to confirm the
request for s to register as a responder for a at the directory.
For example, the directory can send a confirmation email to
the email address a, asking her to confirm that she created an
account at s. The registration attempt at the directory is then
deferred until the user confirms it.
Not only is the directory not a significant DoS target, it can
even assist in DoS defense, in the following senses.
• The primary DoS threat to a requester is the possibility
that some responders always return true, increasing FDRcsd
accordingly. However, the directory can “audit” responders
by issuing queries as a requester itself with a truly random
password, which should garner a false result from every
responder. Any responder whose response generates a true
result is detected as misbehaving.
• Permitting PMT queries against s.susp[a] sets raises the
possibility that an attacker will perform queries repeatedly
to discover the contents of those sets. (In particular, recall
that SUSP+ permits s.pwd[a] to be added to s.susp[a].)
A responder thus should rate-limit PMT queries, just as it
would regular login attempts, to stem such online dictionary
attacks. However, for accounts experiencing an unusually
high rate of queries, the directory can pose CAPTCHAs [67]
back to the requesters as a precondition to forwarding
their queries to responders. In this way, the limited PMT
budgets of responders can be allocated preferentially to
requesters with real users, preventing bots from starving
those requesters.
V. PRIVATELY TESTING SET MEMBERSHIP
An ingredient of our framework in Sec. III is a protocol
by which a requester, having received a password π in a
login attempt for account a, can inquire with a responder
s to determine whether π ∈ s.susp[a]. However, the proto-
col should reveal only this result to the requester, without
divulging s.susp[a] to the requester. Similarly, the protocol
should not disclose to the responder the password input to the
protocol by the requester. This specification is met by a private
membership test (PMT) protocol.
A. The Need for a New Protocol
Several PMT protocols have been proposed (e.g., [49],
[46], [64], [53], [70]). In addition, PMT protocols are closely
related to private set-intersection (PSI; surveyed by Pinkas et
al. [52]) and private set-intersection cardinality protocols (PSI-
CA; e.g., [14], [15], [18], [22], [43]). In particular, having the
requester in a PSI/PSI-CA protocol prove in zero knowledge
that its input is a set of size one yields a PMT protocol.
Considering the additional requirements of our framework
in Secs. III–IV somewhat narrows the options for imple-
menting our PMT, however. First, because our threat model
permits the requester or responder to misbehave arbitrarily, we
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require a protocol that accommodates the malicious behavior
of either party while still protecting the privacy of each
party’s input to the protocol. Second, minimizing rounds of
communication in the protocol is critical for the scalability
of our framework, since these rounds (each with a different
website as responder) will traverse wide-area links and—in the
ULP model (see Sec. IV-A)—an anonymous communication
channel, which will add even more overhead to each round.
For the same reason, we wish to leverage bandwidth-efficient
protocols to the extent possible, and because responders may
need to respond to significant numbers of PMT queries (as
we will analyze in Sec. VI-D), computational efficiency for
the responder is a secondary but still important concern.
PSI protocols based on oblivious transfer (OT) are so far the
fastest PSI protocols tolerant of malicious behavior [55], [56],
though unfortunately OT protocols require at least four rounds
(in the standard model) when tolerating malicious parties (e.g.,
see [32]). To our knowledge, among other PSI protocols that
are secure against malicious behaviors (e.g., [12], [16], [28],
[27], [37], [42], [66], [45]), only those of De Cristofaro et
al. [16] and of Thomas et al. [66] and Li et al. [45] execute
in one round. However, the responses in these protocols are
of size O(ℓ) ciphertexts for a set of size ℓ. While there are
several one-round PSI-CA protocols (e.g., [14], [15], [18],
[22]), we are aware of none that address malicious parties
(without introducing a trusted third party, cf., [15], [18]).
One strategy to improve performance has been to weaken
security in quantified ways against malicious parties. For
example, for an integer χ ≤ ℓ, Thomas et al. [66] and Li
et al. [45] explored protocols in which the requester leaks
log2 χ bits of the requester’s input, in exchange for reducing
the response size to O(ℓ/χ) ciphertexts. In the other direction,
Ramezanian et al. [53] and Wang & Reiter [70] proposed
protocols whereby the responder learns nothing about the
requester’s element, but the requester learns more information
about the responder’s set than just the truth of its membership
query. Specifically, in the Ramezanian et al. protocol [53], the
responder leaks its set to the requester over O(ℓ/χ) responses,
each of O(χ log2
1
p
) bits in size, where p is a tunable false
positive rate for the membership test. The Wang & Reiter
protocol [70] leaks the responder’s set to a malicious requester
over O(ℓ log2
1
p
) responses, each of size only one ciphertext.
The protocol that we propose here is in this latter camp,
allowing a malicious requester to learn the responder’s set
faster than the ideal—but only after Ω( 1
p
) responses, much
better than the Ramezanian et al. and Wang & Reiter protocols.
(Below we term this measure the “extraction complexity” of
the protocol, and justify this claim in Sec. V-F.) The request
and response sizes of our protocol are only O(ℓ/χ) and O(χ)
ciphertexts, respectively.
B. Partially Homomorphic Encryption
Our protocol builds on a partially homomorphic encryption
scheme E = 〈Gen,Enc,Dec,+[·]〉 with these algorithms:
• Gen is a randomized algorithm that on input 1κ outputs a
public-key/private-key pair 〈pk , sk〉 ← Gen(1κ). The value
of pk identifies a prime r for which the plaintext space for
encrypting with pk is the finite field 〈Zr,+,×〉 where+ and
× are addition and multiplication modulo r, respectively.
For clarity below, we denote the additive identity by 0, the
multiplicative identity by 1, and the additive inverse of m ∈
Zr by −m. pk also determines a ciphertext space Cpk =⋃
m∈Zr
Cpk (m), where Cpk (m) denotes the ciphertexts for
plaintext m ∈ Zr.
• Enc is a randomized algorithm that on input public key pk
and a plaintextm ∈ Zr, outputs a ciphertext c ← Encpk (m)
chosen uniformly at random from Cpk (m).
• +[·] is a randomized algorithm that, on input a public key pk
and ciphertexts c1 ∈ Cpk (m1) and c2 ∈ Cpk (m2), outputs
a ciphertext c ← c1 +pk c2 chosen uniformly at random
from Cpk (m1 +m2).
• isZero is a deterministic algorithm that on input a private
key sk and ciphertext c ∈ Cpk , outputs a boolean z ←
isZerosk (c) where z = true iff c ∈ Cpk (0).
Note that our protocol does not require an efficient decryp-
tion capability. Indeed, the instantiation of this scheme that we
leverage, described in App. A, does not support one—though
it does support an efficient isZero calculation.
C. Additional Operators
To express our protocol, it will be convenient to define a few
additional operators involving ciphertexts. These additional
operators can all be expressed using the operators given
in Sec. V-B, and so require no new functionality from the
cryptosystem. Below, “Y
d
= Y ′” denotes that random variables
Y and Y ′ are distributed identically; “Z ∈ (Z)α×α
′
” means
that Z is an α-row, α′-column matrix of elements in the set
Z; and “(Z)i,j” denotes the row-i, column-j element of the
matrix Z.
•
∑
pk denotes summing a sequence using +pk , i.e.,
z∑
pk
k=1
ck
d
= c1 +pk c2 +pk . . .+pk cz
• If C ∈ (Cpk )α×α
′
and C′ ∈ (Cpk )α×α
′
, then C+pk C
′ ∈
(Cpk )
α×α′ is the result of component-wise addition using
+pk , i.e., so that (C+pk C
′)
i,j
d
= (C)i,j +pk (C
′)i,j .
• If M ∈ (Zr)α×α
′
and C ∈ (Cpk )α×α
′
, then M ◦pk C ∈
(Cpk )
α×α′ is the result of Hadamard (i.e., component-wise)
“scalar multiplication” using repeated application of +pk ,
i.e., so that
(M ◦pk C)i,j
d
=
(M)i,j∑
pk
k=1
(C)i,j
• If M ∈ (Zr)α×α
′
and C ∈ (Cpk )α
′×α′′ , then M ∗pk C ∈
(Cpk )
α×α′′ is the result of standard matrix multiplication
using +pk and “scalar multiplication” using repeated appli-
cation of +pk , i.e., so that
(M ∗pk C)i,j
d
=
α′∑
pk
k=1
(M)
i,k∑
pk
k′=1
(C)k,j
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D. Cuckoo Filters
Our PMT protocol, called CUCKOO-PMT, uses a cuckoo
filter [25] as an underlying building block. A cuckoo filter
is a set representation that supports insertion and deletion of
elements, as well as testing membership. The cuckoo filter
uses a “fingerprint” function fprint : {0, 1}∗ → F and a
hash function hash : {0, 1}∗ → [β], where for an integer
z, the notation “[z]” denotes {1, . . . , z}, and where β is a
number of “buckets”. We require that F ⊂ Zr \ {0} for any
r determined by 〈pk , sk〉 ← Gen(1κ), and that members of F
can be distinguished from members of Zr \ F using a public
predicate. (For example, defining F to be the odd elements
of Zr would suffice.) For an integer bucket “capacity” χ, the
cuckoo filter data structure is a χ-row, β-column matrix X of
elements in Zr, i.e., X ∈ (Zr)χ×β . Then, the cuckoo filter
contains the element e if and only if there exists i ∈ [χ] such
that either
(X)i,hash(e) = fprint(e) or (1)
(X)i,hash(e)⊕hash(fprint(e)) = fprint(e) (2)
Cuckoo filters permit false positives (membership tests that
return true for elements not previously added or already
removed) with a probability p that, for fixed χ, can be
decreased by increasing the size of F [25].
E. Protocol Description
Our protocol is illustrated in Fig. 3, where the steps per-
formed by the requester R with input e are shown on the
left in lines r1–r7 (in addition to sending message m1), and
the steps performed by the responder S with cuckoo filter X
are shown on the right in lines s1–s4 (in addition to sending
message m2). The protocol returns true to R if e is in the
cuckoo filter X and false otherwise.
In our protocol, R creates a β-row, 2-column matrix Q
of ciphertexts, where the first column contains a ciphertext
of 1 in row hash(e) and ciphertexts of 0 in other rows,
and where the second column contains a ciphertext of 1
in row hash(e) ⊕ hash(fprint(e)) and ciphertexts of 0 in
others (line r5). The requester also generates a ciphertext f of
− fprint(e) (line r2), and sends this ciphertext and the matrix
Q to S, along with the public key pk (message m1). After
checking in line s1 that f ∈ Cpk , and Q ∈ (Cpk )β×2 (and
that pk is well-formed, which is left implicit in Fig. 3), S
generates a matrix F ∈ (Cpk )χ×2 having a copy of f in
each component (line s2) and a matrix M ∈ (Zr)χ×2 of
random elements of Zr \ {0} (line s3). S then forms the
response matrix R ← M ◦pk ((X ∗pk Q) +pk F), which is
best understood component-wise: (R)i,j is a ciphertext of a
random element of Zr \ {0} if ((X ∗pk Q) +pk F)i,j is a
ciphertext of anything other than 0, since (M)i,j is chosen
at random from Zr \ {0}. Moreover, ((X ∗pk Q) +pk F)i,j
is an encryption of 0 iff (X ∗pk Q)i,j is a ciphertext of
fprint(e), since (F)i,j is a ciphertext of − fprint(e). And
(X ∗pk Q)i,j is a ciphertext of fprint(e) iff either (1) holds
(since (Q)hash(e),1 is an encryption of 1) or (2) holds (since
R(e) S(X)
r1. 〈pk , sk〉 ← Gen(1κ)
r2. f ← Encpk (− fprint(e))
r3. i1 ← hash(e)
r4. i2 ← hash(e)⊕ hash(fprint(e))
r5. ∀i ∈ [β] :
(Q)
i,1
←
{
Encpk (1) if i = i1
Encpk (0) otherwise
(Q)
i,2
←
{
Encpk (1) if i = i2
Encpk (0) otherwise
m1.
pk , f,Q
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
s1. abort if f 6∈ Cpk ∨Q 6∈ (Cpk)
β×2
s2. ∀i ∈ [χ], j ∈ [2] : (F)
i,j
← f
s3. ∀i ∈ [χ], j ∈ [2] : (M)
i,j
$
← Zr \ {0}
s4.R ←M ◦pk ((X ∗pk Q) +pk F)
m2.
R
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
r6. abort if R 6∈ (Cpk)
χ×2
r7. return
∨
i,j
isZerosk ((R)i,j)
Fig. 3: CUCKOO-PMT, described in Sec. V. Matrix types are:
Q ∈ (Cpk )β×2; X ∈ (Zr)χ×β ; F ∈ (Cpk )χ×2; M ∈
(Zr)
χ×2; and R ∈ (Cpk )χ×2.
(Q)hash(e)⊕hash(fprint(e)),2 is an encryption of 1). As such, if R
and S behave correctly, the protocol will return true to R iff
e is an element of the cuckoo filter X.
F. Security Against a Malicious Requester
If the responder follows the protocol, then the only informa-
tion encoded in each (R)i,j is isZerosk ((R)i,j), as a corollary
of the following two propositions.
Proposition 1. If the responder follows the protocol, then
P
(
(R)i,j ∈ Cpk (m)
∣∣ (R)i,j 6∈ Cpk (0)) = 1r−1 for any i ∈
[χ], j ∈ [2], and m ∈ Zr \ {0}.
Proof. ((X ∗pk Q) +pk F)i,j ∈ Cpk , since by line s1, f ∈
Cpk and Q ∈ (Cpk )
β×2. Moreover, ((X ∗pk Q) +pk F)i,j 6∈
Cpk (0) since (R)i,j 6∈ Cpk (0) by assumption. Since (M)i,j
is drawn uniformly from Zr \ {0} (line s3), the plaintext of
(R)i,j is uniformly distributed in Zr \ {0}.
Proposition 2. If the responder follows the protocol, then
P
(
(R)i,j = c
∣∣ (R)i,j ∈ Cpk (m)) = 1|Cpk (m)| for any i ∈ [χ],
j ∈ [2], m ∈ Zr, and c ∈ Cpk (m).
Proof. This is immediate since +pk ensures that for c1 ∈
Cpk (m1) and c2 ∈ Cpk (m2), c1+pk c2 outputs a ciphertext c
chosen uniformly at random from Cpk (m1 +m2).
Prop. 1 and Prop. 2 are also true for the protocol of Wang
& Reiter [70] (henceforth called BLOOM-PMT), in that each
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protocol execution leaks to the requester only one yes/no an-
swer about the responder’s set representation, regardless of the
actions of the requester. A critical distinction exists between
our protocol and BLOOM-PMT, however, in that BLOOM-PMT
permits a malicious requester to craft queries so that the yes/no
answer can be expected to carry a (full) bit of information
to the requester about the responder’s set. We capture this
information leakage using extraction complexity, which is
the expected number of queries for a malicious requester to
extract the responder’s set representation, thereby enabling the
requester to conduct offline attacks on the set. More precisely,
for a fixed responder set Z , the extraction complexity of a PMT
protocol is the expected number of protocol runs required for
a malicious requester to extract enough information from an
honest responder to locally determine e
?
∈ Z for any e with
the same accuracy as the PMT provides.
BLOOM-PMT enables a malicious requester to learn any
single bit in the Bloom-filter representation of the responder’s
set. Since to accommodate a set of size ℓ with false-positive
rate of p for membership tests, a Bloom filter uses O(ℓ log2
1
p
)
bits, this is the extraction complexity for BLOOM-PMT; after
this many queries, the malicious requester knows enough to
conduct an offline attack on set members. In contrast:
Proposition 3. The extraction complexity of CUCKOO-PMT is
Ω( 1
p
).
Proof. Suppose the responder behaves according to the pro-
tocol, and for each i ∈ [β], j ∈ [2], denote by mi,j ∈ Zr the
plaintext such that (Q)i,j ∈ Cpk (mi,j). Similarly, denote by
mf ∈ Zr the plaintext such that f ∈ Cpk (mf ). A corollary
of Props. 1–2 is then that in one PMT response, the requester
learns only the result(
β∑
k=1
(
(X)i,k ×mk,j
))
+mf
?
≡r 0 (3)
for each i ∈ [χ], j ∈ [2], i.e., a total of 2χ linear congruence-
mod-r tests, where the mk,j and mf values are chosen by
the requester. Even if X represents a set consisting of only
a single element e chosen so that fprint(e) is uniformly
distributed in F , confirming the presence of fprint(e) in X
requires, in expectation, testing |F |/2 linear congruences and
so performing |F |/4χ PMT queries. Since |F |/2χ ≥ 1/p to
retain the false-positive rate p [25, Section 5.1], CUCKOO-PMT
has an extraction complexity of Ω( 1
p
) queries.
The lower bound in Prop. 3 is very coarse, in that it applies
even for a cuckoo filter X storing a single element—not to
mention one storing many. Moreover, there are a number of
measures that can make extraction even more difficult for a
malicious requester at minimal expense to the responder.
• The responder can permute each column of X indepen-
dently after each execution of CUCKOO-PMT, since the
query matrix Q produced by a correct requester will select
the same elements from X regardless of this permuting.
Interpreting the results of multiple malicious PMT queries
will become more difficult, however.
• The responder can select any (X)i,j 6∈ F uniformly at
random from Zr \ F , ensuring that any linear test (3)
involving (X)i,j (i.e., for which mi,j 6= 0, using the
notation in the proof of Prop. 3) succeeds with probability
only 1|Zr\F | .
• The responder can randomly permute the elements of R
before returning it, since the result computed by a correct
requester will be the same (line r7). In doing so, the
requester is deprived of knowing which of its linear tests
(3) were satisfied (if any were).
G. Security Against a Malicious Responder
We now prove security for the requester against a malicious
responder. To do so, we define a malicious responder to be a
triple B = 〈B1, B2, B3〉 of algorithms that participates in the
experiment ExptPMT-bCUCKOO-PMT defined as follows:
Experiment ExptPMT-bCUCKOO-PMT (〈B1,B2,B3〉)
〈e0, e1, φ1〉 ← B1()
〈〈pk , f,Q〉, sk〉 ← Rr1-r5(eb)
〈R, φ2〉 ← B2(〈pk , f,Q〉, φ1)
b′ ← Rr6-r7(sk , pk ,R)
b′′ ← B3(φ2, b′)
return b′′
In this experiment, Rr1-r5 denotes steps r1–r5 in Fig. 3,
producing the message m1 and the private key sk . Similarly,
Rr6-r7 denotes steps r6–r7. In the experiment,B1 chooses two
elements e0, e1, and b determines which of the two that is used
in the experiment. B2 is given message m1 and produces the
response matrixR. Finally, B3 is given the final result b
′ of the
protocol from line r7, and outputs a bit b′′. Note that though
Fig. 3 does not disclose R’s result explicitly to S, we allow
it to be disclosed to S (i.e., B3) in this analysis, to permit
CUCKOO-PMT to be used in other contexts (e.g., [70]). We
define the responder-adversary advantage as
AdvPMTCUCKOO-PMT (B) = P
(
ExptPMT-0CUCKOO-PMT (B) = 0
)
− P
(
ExptPMT-1CUCKOO-PMT (B) = 0
)
AdvPMTCUCKOO-PMT (t) = max
B
AdvPMTCUCKOO-PMT (B)
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries B that run
in time t. Intuitively, AdvPMTCUCKOO-PMT (t) captures the ability of
any adversary running in time t to differentiate which of two
passwords of its choice the requester uses to run the protocol.
We reduce security of CUCKOO-PMT against a responder
adversary B to IND-CPA security [2, Definition 5.8] of the
encryption E . The IND-CPA experiment ExptCPA-bˆE is
Experiment ExptCPA-bˆE (A)
〈pk , sk〉 ← Gen(1κ)
bˇ← AEncpk (LR(·,·,bˆ))(pk )
return bˇ
Here, the IND-CPA adversary A is given access to a “left-
or-right” oracle Encpk (LR(·, ·, bˆ)) that takes two plaintexts
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m0,m1 ∈ Zr as input and returns Encpk (mbˆ). Finally, A
returns a bit bˇ, which the experiment returns. We define
AdvCPAE (A) = P
(
ExptCPA-0E (A) = 0
)
− P
(
ExptCPA-1E (A) = 0
)
AdvCPAE (t, q) = max
A
AdvCPAE (A)
where the maximum is taken over all IND-CPA adversaries A
running in time t and making up to q oracle queries.
Proposition 4. AdvPMTCUCKOO-PMT (t) ≤ 2Adv
CPA
E (t
′, q) for q =
2β + 1 and some t′ ≤ 2t.
Proof. Given a responder adversary B = 〈B1, B2, B3〉, we
construct an IND-CPA adversary A as follows. A first invokes
B1 to obtain e0 and e1. Let m0k denote the k-th plaintext
that R would encrypt in an execution of the protocol on
e0, and similarly let m1k denote the k-th plaintext that R
would encrypt in an execution of the protocol on e1. Then, A
simulates R exactly, except using its oracle to obtain the k-th
ciphertext ck ← Encpk (LR(m0k,m1k, bˆ)). Note that because
A does not have sk , it cannot compute b′ as R would, and
so it chooses b′
$
← {0, 1} randomly and provides it to B3.
When B3 outputs b
′′, A copies this bit as its output bˇ.
The value b′ provided to B3 is correct, i.e., b
′ =∨
i,j isZerosk ((R)i,j), with probability 1/2. In this case, the
simulation provided by A to B is perfectly indistinguishable
from a real execution, and so
P
(
Expt
CPA-0
E (A) = 0
)
= P
(
Expt
PMT-0
CUCKOO-PMT (B) = 0
)
and
P
(
ExptCPA-1E (A) = 0
)
= P
(
ExptPMT-1CUCKOO-PMT (B) = 0
)
As such, AdvCPAE (A) ≥
1
2Adv
PMT
CUCKOO-PMT (B). A makes q =
2β + 1 queries to construct Q and f , and consumes time at
most 2t due to the time needed to construct both m0k and
m1k for each k.
VI. PERFORMANCE AND SCALABILITY
In this section, we describe an implementation of our
framework and evaluate its performance and scalability. The
goals of our evaluation are:
• To demonstrate the performance of our framework with
varying parameters that could be used for real-world sce-
narios, e.g., different numbers of participating websites for
different users, and various sizes of suspicious password
sets maintained at a responder;
• To explore the potential performance degradation brought
by adopting Tor to ensure the requester’s login privacy
when the directory is untrusted in this sense (i.e., ULP, as
discussed in Sec. IV); and
• To evaluate the scalability of our prototype and to interpret
its scalability in a real-world context.
A. Implementation
Here, we give the salient details of our prototype implemen-
tation of our framework.
The PMT implementation: We implemented CUCKOO-
PMT (Sec. V) in Go. We instantiated the exponential Elgamal
cryptosystem (App. A) on a prime-order elliptic curve group,
secp256r1 (NIST P-256) [9], [26], which ensures approx-
imately 128-bit symmetric encryption security or 3072-bit
RSA security. For the cuckoo filter, we chose the bucket size
χ = 16, which permits an occupancy of 98%. That is, to
accommodate a set of size ℓ, we need to build a cuckoo filter
with capacity at least ℓ/0.98.
We leveraged precomputation on the requester side for
line r1 and line r5 in Fig. 3. Specifically, the requester can
precompute 〈pk , sk〉, 2β − 2 ciphertexts of 0, and two ci-
phertexts of 1 such that the online part of the computation in
line r5 is simply to assemble the matrix Q.
The directory: We implemented the directory in Go,
leveraging multi-threading to support parallel message pro-
cessing. For each PMT query, the directory shuffles the in-
tended responders’ addresses before forwarding the requester’s
query to those responders and shuffles all responses from
responders before returning them back to the requester. The
first shuffling is to avoid evaluation bias due to the networking
or computation differences among multiple responders. The
second shuffling further weakens the linkability between re-
sponses and source responders, as an extra layer of security
protection against a malicious requester (see Sec. IV).
B. Experimental Setup
We set up one requester, one directory, and up to 256 re-
sponders. The requester and the directory ran on two machines
in our department, both with 2.67GHz × 8 physical cores,
72GiB RAM, and Ubuntu 18.04 x86 64. The 256 responders
were split evenly across eight Amazon EC2 instances in the
Eastern North American region, each with 3.2GHz × 32
physical cores, 256GiB RAM and Ubuntu 18.04 x86 64. Each
responder was limited to one physical core, and had its own
exclusive data files, processes, and network sockets.
To test scenarios where the directory is trusted for login
privacy (TLP) and where it is not (ULP), we set up two dif-
ferent types of communication channels between the requester
and the directory. For the TLP directory, the requester and
the directory communicated directly. For the ULP directory,
we set up a private Tor network, through which the requester
communicated with the directory via a newly built two-hop
(i.e., with two Tor nodes) circuit for each new query to hide
its identity from the directory. These two Tor nodes were
chosen by Tor’s default selection algorithm from eight Tor
nodes running in eight different Amazon datacenters in North
America and Europe. In both the TLP and ULP cases, the
directory communicated with responders directly.
Each reported datapoint is the average of 50 runs. The
relative standard deviations of each datapoint for the TLP
directory and ULP directory scenarios were less than 4% and
8%, respectively.
C. Response Time
We first report the results of our response-time evaluation
experiments for our implementation and setup above. In these
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experiments, the requester issued one CUCKOO-PMT query via
the directory to na responders, and awaited the na responses
from the responders. The response time is the duration ob-
served by the requester between starting to generate a PMT
query (after precomputation) and receiving all responses and
outputting the result. Fig. 4a shows the response time when
directory is trusted for login privacy (TLP), while Fig. 4b
shows the response time when the directory is untrusted for
login privacy (ULP). As mentioned in Sec. VI-B, in the former
case the requester directly connected to the directory, while in
the latter case, the requester communicated with the directory
via a Tor circuit. Tor circuit setup is included in the response-
time measurement. In both cases, the directory had direct
connections with all responders, with no Tor circuits involved.
The main takeaway from Fig. 4 is that when the capacity ℓ
of the suspicious password set at each responder was relatively
small, say ℓ ≤ 29, the response time was less than 1s with a
TLP directory and less than 2s with a ULP directory, even for
users with a large number of web accounts, say na = 256.
Since the average user has far fewer accounts (na ≈ 26 [51]),
and since modern password-management recommendations
would allow suspicious-password sets to be capped at a size
ℓ < 27 (see Sec. III-B), we can expect the response time for
an isolated request to be less than 1s even in the ULP directory
scenario.
D. Scalability
To evaluate the scalability of our framework, we measured
the maximum qualifying response rate that our prototype can
achieve. Here, a qualifying response is one for which the
response time falls within a certain allowance, which we
specified as 5s in the TLP directory case and 8s in the ULP
directory case. For each query, na responders were chosen
uniformly at random from all 256 responders. To produce
a conservative ULP estimate, we required the requester to
communicate with the ULP directory via a new Tor circuit
for each new query, to account for the potential scalability
degradation brought by building Tor connections.
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The results of these tests are shown in Fig. 5. To put
these numbers in context, consider that there are ≈ 369.4M
credential-stuffing login attempts per day for the four U.S.
industries listed in Table I. According to the reported success
rates of credential stuffing, 0.83M of these login attempts
are with correct passwords. Moreover, there are ≈ 187.6M
legitimate login attempts per day in these industries; for a
conservative estimate here, we assume that they all provide the
correct passwords. With the baseline phishing ADS configura-
tion used in Sec. III-C, i.e., (FDRcntads,TDR
cnt
ads) = (0.30, 0.95),
there would be 57.07M (= 187.6M × 0.3 + 0.83M × 0.95)
login attempts per day that induce PMT queries or, in other
words, about 660 PMT queries per second. With the base-
line researching ADS configuration used in Sec. III-C, i.e.,
(FDRcntads,TDR
cnt
ads) = (0.10, 0.99), an analogous calculation
suggests 19.58M PMT queries per day or 227 per second.
Our experiments suggest that our prototype could achieve
these throughputs with just one directory server for a range of
configurations. For example, configured for phishing attackers,
our TLP directory should support the requisite throughput
when ℓ < 27 for up to na ≈ 65 responders. Configured
for researching attackers, even the ULP configuration could
support the expected throughput when ℓ < 27 for up to
na ≈ 35 responders, and the TLP configuration would support
the needed throughput when ℓ < 27 for na as large as
na = 125.
Credential-
stuffing login
attempts per day
Proportion that
succeed
Proportion of
all login
attempts
Industry [59, Tables 3–6] [59, Tables 3–6] [59, Fig. 13]
Airline 1.4M 1.00% 60%
Hotel 4.3M 1.00% 44%
Retail 131.5M 0.50% 91%
Consumer
banking
232.2M 0.05% 58%
TABLE I: Credential-stuffing estimates for U.S. industries
Though already encouraging, these results leveraged only
one requester machine and one directory machine, and con-
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centrated all PMT queries to be served by (a randomly
chosen subset of size na of) the same 256 responders, each
allocated only a single CPU core. Responder CPU was the
bottleneck in the TLP experiments. Tor was the bottleneck in
the ULP experiments, being the only difference from the TLP
experiments. With a more dispersed query pattern launched
from more requesters, with more capable responders, and with
a distributed directory, our design could scale even further.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed a novel framework by which
websites can coordinate to detect credential-stuffing attacks
on individual accounts. Our framework accommodates the
tendencies of human users to reuse passwords, to enter their
passwords into incorrect sites, etc., while still providing good
detection accuracy across a range of operating points. The
framework is built on a new private membership-test protocol
that scales better than previous alternatives and/or ensures a
higher extraction complexity, which captures the ability of
a requester in the protocol to extract enough information to
search elements of the set offline. Using probabilistic model
checking applied to novel experiments designed to capture
both usability and security, we quantified the benefits of our
framework. Finally, we showed through empirical results with
our prototype implementation that our design should scale
easily to accommodate the login load of large sectors of the
U.S. economy, for example.
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APPENDIX
A cryptosystem that can be used to instantiate the specifica-
tion of Sec. V-B is a variant of ElGamal encryption [23] com-
monly referred to as “exponential ElGamal” and implemented
as follows (see, e.g., [11]). It uses an algorithm ElGamalInit
that, on input 1κ, outputs a multiplicative abelian group G of
order r for a κ-bit prime r.
• Gen(1κ) generatesG← ElGamalInit(1κ); selects u
$
← Zr;
and returns a private key sk = 〈u〉 and public key pk =
〈G, g, U〉, where g is a generator of G, and U ← gu.
• Enc〈G,g,U〉(m) returns 〈V,W〉 where V ← g
v , v
$
← Zr,
and W ← gmUv .
• 〈V1,W1〉+〈G,g,U〉 〈V2,W2〉 returns 〈V1V2g
y,W1W2U
y〉 for
y
$
← Zr if {V1,W1, V2,W2} ⊆ G and returns⊥ otherwise.
• isZero〈u〉(〈V,W〉) returns true if {V,W} ⊆ G and W =
V u, and returns false otherwise.
To use this cryptosystem in CUCKOO-PMT, it is necessary
to test for ciphertext validity (line s1 and line r6). The next
proposition shows that it suffices to test membership in G.
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Proposition 5. For the exponential ElGamal cryptosystem,
C〈G,g,U〉 = G×G.
Proof. C〈G,g,U〉 ⊆ G×G follows by construction, and so we
focus on proving G×G ⊆ C〈G,g,U〉. For any 〈V,W〉 ∈ G×G,
consider the group element WV −u where gu = U . Since g
is a generator of G, there is a plaintext m ∈ Zr such that
gm =WV −u and so 〈V,W〉 ∈ C〈G,g,U〉(m).
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